A voting experiment on the input and output of electoral systems and voter satisfaction

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HUFFPOST



Our Voting System Isn't Just Unfair - it's Tearing Our Country Apart



Quando la legge elettorale non aiuta il Paese

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Wien braucht ein gerechtes Wahlsystem

The impact of the electoral rules on voter satisfaction: the story thus far

Voter satisfaction with elections = satisfaction with democracy

- More votes my party \Rightarrow higher satisfaction with democracy
- $\bullet\,$ More proportional the system $\Rightarrow\,$ higher satisfaction with democracy
- Many (un-)answered questions:
 - More parties, more satisfaction?
 - More proportional the system or more proportional the outcome?

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Aims of our project

- Disentangle the effect of the *inputs* and *outputs* of electoral rules on voter satisfaction.
 - Inputs: party supply and type of vote.
 - Outputs: (own) party performance and proportionality.
- Examine voter satisfaction with specific aspects of electoral systems:

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- party supply
- voting rules
- ③ election outcomes
- a vote-to-seat conversion
- (overall) electoral system.

The research design of our project using PUMA data

Vignette experiment with two segments (mimic the stages of elections)

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The research design of our project using PUMA data

Vignette experiment with two segments (mimic the stages of elections)

• First segment: respondents vote: 4 (2x2) voting scenarios

	Type of vote choice	
Party supply	Categorical	Ordinal
Low	3; vote for one party only	3; ranking all parties
High	5; vote for one party only	5; ranking all parties

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The research design of our project using PUMA data

Vignette experiment with two segments (mimic the stages of elections)

• First segment: respondents vote: 4 (2x2) voting scenarios

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
• Second segment: results announced: 4 (2x2) result scenarios

	Proportionality	
Party vote share	Low	High
Low	14%; disproportional	14%; proportional
High	44%; disproportional	44%; proportional

Example of voting scenario




Bei dieser **Abstimmungsregel** können Sie **nur eine Partei** auswählen, indem Sie das zugehörige Kästchen **ankreuzen**.



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First segment

Satisfaction with party supply & voting rules



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
Example of result scenario

PARTEI STIMMEN % SITZE % LINKS 14% 14% MITTE 41% 41% RECHTS 45% 45% Summe 100% 100%

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
Second segment

Satisfaction with the electoral results & proportionality of the rules



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Satisfaction with the electoral system



Summary

- More parties \Rightarrow more satisfaction.
- More choice \Rightarrow no more satisfaction.
- Higher party performance \Rightarrow more satisfaction.
- Higher proportionality ⇒ more satisfaction.
- More generally, the findings indicate that citizens can distinguish between different aspects of the voting rules.

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Extension: going comparative

- Results specific to Austria?
- No, same results in Sweden (similar electoral system used in Austria) (work conducted with Högström John)
- Results specific to (Austrian and Swedish) proportional system?
- Data collection currently under way in UK (majoritarian system) and Ireland (STV system)

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